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Westphal’s project seeks to read Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason against the tran-
scendental idealist grain whilst highlighting resources and insights from Kant’s 
commonsense perceptual realism. The book is divided into three parts: I) Episte-
mological Context, II) Kant’s Critical Epistemology, and III) Further Ramifica-
tions. While Westphal commits to an impressive and sundry review of Kant’s 
First Critique, balanced with Neo-Kantian bricolage, the central theses that he 
offers draw from Kant’s three Analogies of Experience and the four Paralogisms 
of Rational Psychology, with interest in the relationship between Kant’s theory 
of perceptual judgment and account of empirical knowledge.1 Westphal makes 
the case that Kant’s first Critique correctly defends a robust fallibilist account of 
empirical justification, an insight that has eclipsed most, if not all, previous Kant-
ian interlocutors. Despite Westphal’s book is brimming with analyses and cri-
tiques of philosophers inspired by and reacting to Kant, historical and contempo-
rary, the true merits of Westphal’s project are in his erudite parsing of the first 
Critique with cognitive semantics in mind. 
The first three chapters, which comprise the first section, find Westphal situ-
ating Kant within the history of analytic epistemology. In developing this section, 
Westphal enumerates the state of epistemology prior to Kant—guided by the Car-
tesian assumption and epitomized by Hume, epistemology was anchored to evi-
dential data, with states of sensory-consciousness undifferentiated from states of 
self-consciousness awareness. This presumption, when conjoined with infallibilist 
assumptions about cognitive justification—the infallibilist doctrine being that 
nothing short of provability suffices for justification—inevitably leads to the ego-
centric predicament of Cartesian skepticism and internalist infallibilism. West-
phal’s project stakes to evince that Kant is the first great non-Cartesian epistemol-
ogist, developing forms of externalism not only about mental content and causal 
judgment, but also about cognitive justification (49). 
By the end of the first chapter, we see Westphal’s thesis begin to take shape: 
that, although necessary, sensory stimulation is insufficient for cognitive warrant. 
Sense-data is such that we can process it by bringing it under concepts in judgments 
whereby we classify and identify the various particulars (objects, events, structures, 
processes or persons) surrounding us. Throughout Westphal’s project, this will re-
appear in different applicatory scenarios, ranging from semantics to perceptual psy-
chology to metaethics. Westphal’s ultimate Critical endeavor is to poise Kant via 
scientific realism’s mold, making the case that Kant’s anti-skeptical transcendental 
proof(s) demonstrates that any human being who is apperceptive—insofar as they 
are aware of some appearances appearing to occur before, during, or after others—
“must actually perceive at least some particulars in her or his surroundings, in order 
to identify even a presumptive, approximate temporal sequence amongst appear-
ances” (219). Situating Kantian epistemology historically throughout these first 
three chapters, Westphal cites a number of contemporary epistemological puzzles, 
such as Gettier-type problems regarding justified true belief and the examples 
 
1 Kant, I. 1998, Critique of  Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, §A190, 
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therewith, which centrally involve what are termed “externalist” factors bearing 
upon the justificatory status of Someone's beliefs—factors such that Someone can-
not become aware of truth-laden belief(s) by simple reflection. Following Descartes’ 
cogito argument, stilted on the putative self-transparency of beliefs qua ideas—and 
those Cartesian epistemologists prioritizing access-internalist infallibilism regarding 
inner experience—“internalism” was launched in the service of what Westphal 
terms “global perceptual skepticism”.2 Kant’s fallibilism, and his transcendental 
proof that we can only be self-conscious of our existence as determined in time via 
apperception if we have some perceptual experience and knowledge of spatio-tem-
poral causally active substances in our surroundings, counters the skeptical gener-
alization from occasional perceptual error to the possibility of universal perceptual 
error (or, mutatis mutandis, insufficient cognitive justification): 
  
[…] any world in which we are altogether perceptually deluded is a world in which 
no human being can be apperceptive [...]. Global perceptual sceptics simply as-
sume that we can be self-conscious without being conscious of anything outside 
our minds. Kant’s transcendental proof of realism shows just how portentous is 
this assumption (227-28).  
 
Furthermore, Kant’s three principles of causal judgment, as detailed in the three 
Analogies of Experience anchor Westphal’s description of our cognitive capacity 
for identifying enduring events:  
 
1. Substance persists through changes of state.  
2. Changes of state in any one substance are regular or law governed. 
3. Causal relations between substances are causal interactions (147).  
 
Kant's three Analogies are universally quantified and these principles guide causal 
judgment. Moving from phenomenal causality to cognitive semantics, having 
now broadly outlined his project’s ambitions, Westphal’s second section, “Kant’s 
Critical Epistemology”, is comprised of six chapters (viz., chapters 4-9). Notably, 
it is in the fourth chapter, “Constructing Kant's Critique of Pure Reason”, where 
Westphal begins to formalize Kant’s semantics of singular, specifically cognitive, 
reference, prodding philosophy of language, epistemology, and Kant scholarship 
into truly novel and exciting territory. Westphal first makes the general case that 
to understand empirical knowledge we must distinguish between predication as a 
grammatical form of sentences, statements or (candidate) judgments, and predi-
cation as a (proto-)cognitive act of ascribing some characteristic(s) or feature(s) to 
some localized particular(s). By way of Kant, Westphal argues that term “partic-
ulars” ought to be construed broadly so as to include any kind of particular we 
may localize within space and time. Kant sought to expound upon a general phe-
nomenon rather than individual facts, thus systematizing how natural regularities 
can be and are localized. Westphal argues that Kant’s semantics of singular refer-
ence achieves verification empiricism without invoking empiricism. Contra verifi-
cationist theories of meaning—which only require logically consistent proposi-
tions—and whether stated in terms of concepts, propositions, or judgments, 
Kant’s justification of realism involves explicating classificatory content 
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descriptions vis-à-vis further requirements involved in actually classifying or iden-
tifying any extant instance so-described, doing so accurately, warrantedly/justi-
fiedly and, thus, cognizantly. 
By the sixth chapter, Westphal has successfully bridged Kant’s objective sig-
nificance and justifiable cognitive judgment with the refutation of global percep-
tual skepticism. Thus follows one of Westphal’s most interesting developments: 
drawing from the Transcendental Deduction’s description of synthesis in appre-
hension, where perception must fully accord with the category of quantity, Kant’s 
Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference “concerns the cognitive, and hence also 
the epistemological significance of identifying by locating those individuals to 
which we ascribe any features, by which alone we can know them and can claim 
to have knowledge of them” (117). Constructing Kant's Semantics of Singular 
Cognitive Reference, Westphal espouses Gareth Evans’ notion of predication as 
ascription, which requires conjointly specifying a relevant spatio-temporal region 
and manifest characteristics of any particular that we self-consciously experience 
or identify (§55).3 These conjoint specifications allow for the ascription of manifest 
characteristics that are mutually independent cognitive achievements, integrating 
sensation/sense-data and conception/understanding through co-operation and in-
tegration. Westphal eventually develops a Critical method wherein: 
 
Sensibility is required (though not sufficient) for sensing the various manifest char-
acteristics of the sensed particular, and directing us to its location; Understanding 
is required (though not sufficient) for explicitly identifying its region and its man-
ifest characteristics, thus enabling us to be apperceptively aware of this particular 
(262). 
 
Westphal argues that Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference services epis-
temology by substantiating that knowledge, justified belief, or experience of or 
about particulars require satisfying further conditions than those of conceptual 
content (“intension”) or linguistic meaning alone. No matter how specified or 
detailed a description/intension may be, it cannot, by itself, determine whether it 
is referentially empty, determinate, or ambiguous because it describes what there 
is: either zero, one, or several individuals. However, to know any spatio-temporal 
particular requires correctly ascribing characteristics to it and localizing it in space 
and time. Via ostensive designation, we ascribe predicates used in our judgments 
to some putatively known particular, differentiating and characterizing it. The 
ascription of characteristics is required for singular, specifically cognitive, reference 
to a spatio-temporal particular, providing the necessary requirement for the truth-
evaluability of our claims.  
Between Chapters 6-9, Westphal aims to further enrich Kant’s cognitive se-
mantics qua particulars in order to provide a legitimate stand-alone epistemological 
doctrine. It follows that, insofar as epistemological “success term(s)” are consid-
ered, logical consistency requires that Someone uses that predicative proposition as-
criptively to describe characteristics or features to some localized particulars. Kant’s 
transcendental sense of “real possibility” denies that descriptions alone suffice for 
knowledge—no description suffices to specify and therefore determine whether 
there is any particular in some specific context by way of sentential meaning, as 
reference to some extant perceptual particular is required. Westphal pellucidly 
 
3 Evans, G. 1975, “Identity and Predication”, Journal of  Philosophy, 72, 13, 343-63. 
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writes that “only when the performer known as Prince ordered and purchased a 
flamboyantly purple guitar did the concept ‘purple guitar’ come to have ‘real possi-
bility’ in Kant’s full, referable-in-practice, empirical sense of this designation” (246). 
This undermines Russellian-cum-Quinean confidence in mere intension (predicates 
as classifications, explicated as mere descriptive phrases) and regimenting indexi-
cals. Kant’s demonstrative (“deictic”) reference is required to obtain even candidate 
cognitive claims. Speaking does not suffice to speak about any individual thing, per-
son, event, structure. Merely speaking or thinking intelligibly/understandably re-
quires avoiding self-contradiction, whereas cognition or any claim to knowledge 
requires localizing the putatively known individual(s) within space and time, to-
gether with some approximately correct attribution of characteristics to it or them. 
Only in referential contexts can we advance from uttering sentences to making any 
epistemically warranted cognitive statement or claim (§89). 
More broadly, Westphal's point is that empirical knowledge and semantic 
meaning involve more than simply supplying values for logical variables, as such 
stipulations, by design, abstract from descriptive identification and intelligibility 
while presuming purported reference. Reading Kant's reference-in-practice vis-à-
vis Tetens’ realisieren, Westphal articulates a key “deictic point” central to the con-
ditions that must be satisfied so as to be able to make any sufficiently accurate 
attribution to even claim that something is such-and-so: 
 
S/he must localize that (or those) particulars to which (or to whom) S/he purports 
to ascribe any feature(s), so as (putatively) to know (cognize) it or them. Cognition 
is not secured by fortunate guesses in the form of mere descriptions which happen 
to have (had) some instance somewhere or other within nature or history. Cogni-
tion requires identifying by locating relevant particulars so as to be able to know 
them, or even to mistake them! (118) 
 
Truth pertaining to knowledge, and therefore to epistemology, requires demon-
strative reference to relative particulars. Only under these conditions can there by 
candidate objects of knowledge. Westphal’s project recalls Carnap's “descriptive 
semantics”—the pragmatic use of propositions when making cognitive judgments 
in suitable perceptual or experimental contexts about localized individuals/par-
ticulars.4 As demonstrated by Kant's Analogies, the causal principles regulating 
our causal judgments do so by guiding our identifying efficient causes of observed 
spatio-temporal events. Making such discriminatory, perceptual-causal judg-
ments to identify particulars within our surroundings requires anticipation and 
modal imagination to consider relevant causally possible alternatives to the ap-
parently perceived causal scenario. Westphal here argues that Kant's conception 
of “imagination” is not simply imaging/picture-thinking, but empirically in-
formed counterfactual reasoning about causal possibilities. 
The constitutive point in Kant's three Analogies involves our typically relia-
ble capacities to distinguish and discriminate various kinds of causal sequences 
and processes amongst the perceptible, causally structured, and interacting par-
ticulars that surround us (§§48-49).5 These particulars regulate our causal judg-
ments. Were we unable to make any such causal discrimination(s) and identifica-
tion(s) accurately and justifiedly, we would altogether lack apperception of our 
 
4 Carnap, R. 1956, Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of  Chicago Press. 
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own existence as determined in time. Westphal’s cognitive-semantic point here 
has far-reaching relevance for philosophy of language and epistemology, as well 
as for the history and philosophy of science, theory of action, and philosophy of 
mind. As will become the nexus for the third section of Westphal’s book, which 
concerns scientific realism, Kant's cognitive semantics is embedded in and 
strongly supports Newton's causal realism regarding gravitational force—West-
phal makes the case that Newton's methodological Rule 4 of (experimental) phi-
losophy requires any competing scientific hypothesis to have not merely empirical 
evidence in its favor but also sufficient evidence with sufficient precision to either 
make an accepted scientific theory or law more exact or to restrict it and demon-
strate exceptions to the rule (§§66-67). It is here that Westphal’s reading of Kant, 
rigorous and unique when applied to semantics and epistemology, feels some-
what wanting—while the reader will feel assured that Kant’s context-bound ex-
ternalist epistemology warrants cognitive application within the non-formal do-
main of empirical knowledge, the diachronic development of physics and other 
such natural sciences are necessarily tethered to the uptake of particulars (i.e., 
replicated experiments and tests). Indeed, the Sellarsian apothegm rings true that 
there are as many scientific images of man as there are sciences which have some-
thing to say about man, where each science deploys distinct instruments and 
methods. It would thus be fruitful if Westphal, particularly given his Hegelian 
expertise, further explored the always-developing and self-correcting descriptive 
and explanatory resources of the scientific image and how it shapes rational judg-
ments, which cannot be exhausted by the causal locutions of justificatory judg-
ment, while at once pointing towards a radically non-normative picture of our-
selves.  Westphal briefly touches on this important consideration but his elabora-
tion of Kant’s work on transeunt causal action via rule-governed succession of 
states does not contend with the irresolvable frame-bound discrepancies between 
various scientific theories (quantum mechanics vs. Newtonians classical mechan-
ics) or quantum measurement (viz. perceptual observation overdetermines super-
position). 
Despite this very minor limitation, Westphal’s engagement with Kant vis-à-
vis the history of philosophy is extremely fertile. The second section’s latter chap-
ters find Westphal reviewing Kant's inventory of cognitive capacities, describing 
Kant’s insights into rational judgment as articulating “sensationism” about sen-
sations, the view that sensations typically are components of acts of awareness of 
particulars. Situating Kant as steeped in the Humean predicament of psychologi-
cal epistemology, Westphal illuminates Kant's account of consciousness by pars-
ing an issue pertinent to contemporary representationalist accounts of percep-
tion—that if a sensory idea is caused by an object, then that idea also represents 
some feature of that object. In the philosophy of perception and neurophysiology, 
this issue transpires in the “binding problem(s)”—a problem concerning cognitive 
psychology that deals with explaining what unites any group of sensations into 
what might be a unified, fluid percept of any one object (§22). This problem arises 
synchronically within any moment of perception of an object and arises diachron-
ically as a problem of integrating successive percepts of the same object: one set 
of issues is sensory, concerning the generation of sensory appearances to each of 
us; the second set is intellectual, concerning how we recognize the various parcels 
of sensory information we receive through sensory experience to be information 
about a spatio-temporally consistent object. Westphal makes the case that Kant's 
Transcendental Logic may provide us with a helpful conceptual primer here, as it 
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concerns the kinds of judgment (classification, differentiation, conditionalization) 
required to identify, distinguish, track and classify individuals perceived in our 
surroundings. Although Westphal is not the first philosopher to cull Kant’s unity 
of consciousness as relevant to the binding problem, the case study strengthens 
Westphal judgment-first epistemological approach, with the a priori concepts 
space and time utilized to identify any (actual) region of space and period of time 
in which various particulars change, are perceived, and are arranged.  
Chapter 8 and 9 are perhaps Westphal's strongest chapters. It is here that 
Kant's epistemological findings about perception and causal judgment crystalize, 
with Westphal elaborating on Kant’s proofs of content externalism. It follows that 
any world in which human beings are capable of apperceptive experience is one 
that must provide us some minimal regularity and variety amongst the contents 
of our sensations. This is what allows us to make judgments by way of identifying 
objects or events, for it is by way of judgment, and not sense-data, that we can 
distinguish ourselves from the objects that populate our environs and achieve ap-
perception (§51). Kant’s semantic point about singular cognitive reference and the 
proof of mental content externalism are here reinforced by his proof that we can 
only make legitimate causal judgments about spatio-temporal particulars (viz., 
persisting substances) using our conceptual categories.  
The final third of the book, titled Further Ramifications, comprises four 
chapters. Chapter 10 elaborates on the aforementioned thesis regarding scientific 
realism, which veers towards a programmatic Carnapian rendering. However, it 
is Westphal’s consideration of the free will vs. determinism debate that occupies 
the bulk of the final chapters. Westphal approaches this debate qua metaphysics 
rather than metaethics and, as is characteristic of Westphal’s reading—contra 
those interpreters who contend that Kant’s compatibilism entails the truth of 
causal determinism and, thus, insist upon the wellspring of the noumenon for 
radical freedom—Westphal reads Kant’s argument here without appealing to his 
transcendental idealism. Westphal argues that Kant reveals the entire free will vs. 
determinism debate as void, intractable, and an argumentum ad ignorantium (§§74-
83). This will undoubtedly serve as the most controversial section for those Kant 
scholars who uphold the “two-worlds” view as key to linking Kant’s practical and 
theoretical philosophy. Nevertheless, Westphal’s judgment-first approach offers 
a robust conception of normativity, where “rational judgment is normatively 
structured insofar as it consists in critical assessment of justifying grounds, prin-
ciples, evidence and our use of them in any specific judgment, and because the 
normative character of justificatory judgment cannot be reduced to, nor elimi-
nated by, causal considerations” (288). In Chapters 11-12, Westphal argues that 
Kant's account of causal judgment suffices to preserve the possibility of free and 
imputable action at the psychological level. Westphal underscores that we can 
only make accurate and justifiable causal judgments about spatio-temporal partic-
ulars—causal knowledge results from successful, exclusively causal explanation 
of actual events but the principle of universal causal determinism is not, nor can 
be, a known causal law at the psychological register.  
Reviewing Kant’s Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Westphal asserts that we 
have well-justified causal beliefs only to the extent that we have credible evidence 
for causal explanation of events.6 Consequently, the transcendental causal princi-
ple, that every event has a cause, is a regulative principle of causal inquiry and we 
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obtain causal knowledge only from successful causal explanation, which does not 
obtain for inner psychology (mental events). Mistaking the causal principle for a 
justified causal law is an instance of “transcendental subreption”, of “mistaking 
conditions for the possibility of human experience for substantive features of the 
world we experience” (167). Westphal emphasizes that Kant’s principles of causal 
judgment, as justified in the “Analogies”, only hold when referred to spatio-tem-
poral substances; via modus tollens, causal judgment cannot be known to hold of 
merely psychological phenomena (§§45-46). Here, the physicalist may rejoinder: 
but inner psychology is composed of physical neural events, and thus spatio-tem-
poral particulars-cum-substances which we can represent and use as positive em-
pirical evidence given our contemporary brain-imaging techniques (e.g., fMRI, 
EKG)! Westphal does not consider such responses, leaving (naturalist) readers 
who might agree with Westphal’s sidelining Kant’s transcendental idealism teem-
ing with such queries. Nevertheless, Westphal also takes a second approach to 
determinism, not via psychology but bodily behavior. Appealing to Kant’s tran-
scendental justification of bodily comportment within perceptible judgment, 
Westphal claims that causal behavior is underinformed and that identifying caus-
ally interacting substances in our surroundings does not justify causal determin-
ism universally across the domain of spatio-temporal events. Westphal links his 
conception of the freedom of behavior to the semantics of cognitive behavior via 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)—that every event has a sufficient cause 
or causes—claiming that it suffices as a regulative principle guiding causal in-
quiry, causal explanation, and causal judgment; it is not, nor can it be, a principle 
known to hold constitutively of all events within space and time (§§79-80). West-
phal warns against our mistaking the PSR for an "unrestricted universal, demon-
strated (i.e., cognitively fully and unrestrictedly justified) assertoric law of causal-
ity" (299)—we must never mistake a principle of causal inquiry for successful out-
comes of such inquiry.  
Westphal underscores that Richard McCarty conflates the causal principle—
that each spatio-temporal event has (a) numerically distinct spatio-temporal 
cause(s)—for an established assertoric causal law, whereby every event in fact has 
some sufficient set of causes.7 Westphal responds that: "Kant’s Critical strictures 
on causal judgments within the merely temporal psychological domain entail that 
we cannot know pro or contra whether psychological phenomena are causally 
structured, or are causally deterministic" (321). Westphal is correct that a com-
plete cause-and-effect schema will, necessarily, always be incomplete: enumerat-
ing a causally-closed map will forever be undermined by the nature of open sys-
tems, i.e., the fact that space and time are always present. But does this preclude 
reflection on causal determinism via best-inference? For Westphal, in the domain 
of human behavior, such attempts will make use of unjustified suppositions based 
on under-informed models, which are supplanted by highly abbreviated and 
short-hand causal commands.  
Rather than relaying his critique to develop a metaethical doctrine separate 
from the Categorical Imperative and its noumenal purview, Westphal’s method-
ological concerns brings him to conclude the book by advocating scientific real-
ism. This will, indeed, satisfy naturalist Kantians like myself who are favorable 
towards Sellars’ rendering. For Westphal, the supposition that mere logical pos-
sibilities undermine cognitive justification remains pervasive and props up 
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cognitive skepticism, tendering multitudinous concerns in epistemology and phi-
losophy of mind like the “hard problem” of consciousness, which trade in logical 
possibilities rather than demonstrative reference. Westphal’s critique is leveled at 
philosophical methodologies that ascribe various characteristics to something that 
does not suffice for any actual ascription—as delineated by the semantics of cog-
nitive reference, actual ascription always requires localizing relevant particular(s) 
sufficiently to discriminate them.  
For Westphal, the conjoint implication of the Analogies of Experience and 
the Paralogisms of Rational Psychology is that we cannot make any legitimate, 
justifiable causal judgments about internal, psychological, or temporal states/oc-
currences. While there may loom large the impulse to project the universal deter-
minist principle of binding causality from the constitutive principle of objective 
experience, Westphal is quick to remind us that this is what Kant criticized as 
“transcendental subreption”—mistaking transcendental conditions of the possi-
bility of apperceptive human experience and knowledge for ontological condi-
tions constitutive of spatio-temporal objects. Westphal conclusively claims that 
the debate of determinism vs. free will is not only deeply unsatisfactory but an 
empty question; philosophy would do better to engage in exercises of specific 
judgment or matters of action via the compatibilist framework that asks "[t]o what 
extent, or in what regard(s) is each action free?" (304). One hopes, however, that 
Westphal is not content with deeming the entire Kantian-metaethical purview of 
practical philosophy an altogether empty pursuit—it is here that the reader may 
underscore that the determinism vs. free will debate is tethered to critical ques-
tions concerning responsibility, culpability, and freedom. This debate informs our 
evaluative norms, reactive attitudes, and pragmatics, down to influencing juris-
prudence and legislation; opting out of the debate may not be a choice when so 
much of our moral system is carved around it. Considering that reasons for doing 
are never categorially given, like sense-data, and that no moral particulars can be 
identified a priori, Westphal’s prescription risks lapsing into abdication. Although 
Westphal is not a moral philosopher, having stepped into the metaethical boxing 
ring, the onus looms large for Westphal, and us as his readers, to grapple with 
how, and if, a judgment-first epistemology obtains in the metaethical terrain. De-
spite this query—which Westphal’s construction very well may provide an an-
swer to, although it must be made explicit—Westphal’s epistemological rendering 
of Kant, particularly his work on cognitive semantics and content externalism, 
achieves the goal of proving Kant a meticulous epistemologist. 
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